Year three of Decred's Politeia in numbers and graphs

A look at Politeia's third year

Decred Blockchain Analysis - Part 2 PoW wow

Second report on Decred on chain data, this time looking at PoW mining and demonstrating some new clustering and analysis techniques.

Year two of Decred's Politeia in numbers and graphs

A look at Politeia's second year

Decred Blockchain Analysis - Part 1

First look at Decred on chain data

Decred Market Maker Monitoring - Phase 1 Wrap-Up

Analysis of the markets which i2 Trading have been making

Decred Market Maker Monitoring

Analysis of the markets which i2 Trading have been making

The First Year of Decred's Politeia

Politeia has been live for one year now, and I have been reflecting on how it has gone in relation to what I was expecting and hoping when it launched. For a more quantitative overview see this report. Voting to make decisions As a Decred contributor, having Politeia available is great because now issues where there is no clear consensus among the community can be resolved by a stakeholder vote.

One year of Decred's Politeia in numbers and graphs

A look at Politeia data for the first year

Pi Research

Analysis of Politeia data.

Market Maker proposal voting analysis

Analysis of how tickets voted on the 3 Market Maker proposals.

User data review 2019/07

A look at aggregated user activity data.

Do early votes influence proposal voting outcomes?

An initial exploration of temporal dynamics in ticket voting

Politeia Quorum Requirement Exploration

This piece considers how changing the way that the quorum requirement is defined for Politeia proposals would affect the outcomes of proposal votes.

The role of Decred voters in defending against majority attacks

This post introduces the concept of a majority (51%) attack and gives a short account of the role that Decred’s voters play in defending against these. I will briefly describe how majority attacks against Proof of Work (PoW) currencies work first, then explain how the additional Proof of Stake (PoS) component changes the dynamic in Decred’s case. Performing a double spend attack means having the power to reorg (reorganize, or rewrite) the blockchain.

Working for the Decred DAO

Working for the Decred DAO In 2018 I became a Decred contractor, and as the year draws to a close I’m planning to spend a higher proportion of my working time on the project next year. This post is about my experience of working on Decred, why I’m into it and how it works. Autonomy, and minimal administrative or management type experiences, are worth a lot to me. “Going to work” on/for Decred is contributing to one of the (varied and expanding) selection of sub-projects that are open.

First look at Politeia comments and up/down votes

A first look at the data on Politeia comments and votes.

On the Launch of Decred's Politeia

The launch of Politeia marks a significant step in Decred’s development, expanding stakeholder governance beyond its core function of adopting or rejecting changes to the consensus rules, and equipping stakeholders with a means of making other kinds of decisions. These decisions can be as fundamental as extending or refining the project’s very purpose. Ticket-voting stakeholders are about to assume full control of the project’s direction. Some sort of amendment to the Decred constitution is highly likely, and proposals for a number of other high-level policies have been discussed.

Decentralized Autonomous Funding of Blockchain Projects

This post considers the funding of blockchain projects through treasuries owned and operated by stakeholders. Specifically, it re-visits the Dash Treasury DAO and its support services, and considers what Decred can learn from this example ahead of the upcoming launch of Politeia. It also sets out some broad differences between the approaches of Dash and Decred, and considers how autonomous funding fits with commons based peer production. How are cryptocurrency projects funded?

A User Perspective and Introduction to Blockchain Governance

This article gives my perspective on the governance of blockchains and cryptocurrencies. I didn’t take much interest in the blockchain space until summer of 2017, when the Bitcoin Cash fork and the underlying reasons for it caught my attention. I started looking into this and discovered an interest in how these decentralized networks/projects/currencies make decisions about how they should evolve. On the one hand these are (mostly) open source software projects, but on the other hand the software is being used to run networks that hold hundreds of millions of dollars in value.

Governance of the Decred project subsidy through Politeia

Governance of the Decred project subsidy through Politeia I’ve recently taken an interest in cryptocurrency projects that are attempting to decentralize various aspects of their governance. Decred is interesting in this regard because it aims to decentralize decision-making about both: the adoption of consensus changes that require hard forks the spending of a project subsidy (10% of the block reward) Decred Governance Basics Decred combines Proof of Work (PoW, 60% of block reward) with Proof of Stake (PoS: 30% of block reward) to secure the network, with the remaining 10% of the block reward going into a project subsidy wallet to fund development of the project.